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Amazingly, one is used to hearing harsh statements about inefficient public 
services. Nor is it surprising to see public sector performance questioned. What is 
surprising is that what is meant by performance, and how it is measured, does not 
seem to matter to either the critics or the advocates of the public sector. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest a definition, and a way to measure the 
performance of the public sector or rather of its main components. Our approach is 
explicitly rooted in the principles of welfare and production economics. We will 
proceed in four stages. First of all we present what we call the "performance 
approach" to the public sector. This concept rests on the principal-agent relation 
that links a principal, i.e., the State, and an agent, i.e., the person in charge of the 
public sector unit, and on the definition of performance as the extent to which the 
agent fulfils the objectives assigned by the principal. The performance is then 
measured by using the notion of productive efficiency and the "best practice" 
frontier technique. 
 
In the second stage we move to the issue of measuring the performance of some 
canonical components of the public sector (education, health care and railways 
transport), assuming that there is no constraint as to data availability. The idea is 
to disentangle the usual confusion between conceptual and data problems. In the 
third stage, we move to real world data problems. The question is then that given 
the available data, does it make sense to assess and measure the performance of 
such public sector activities. The final stage is to explain performance or rather 
lack thereof and to look at the contribution of such an exercise for public policy. 
 
Finally we argue that when the scope is not components but the entirety of the 
public sector, one should restrict the performance analysis to the outputs and not 
relate it to inputs. 
 
                                                           
1 I am grateful to Tim Coelli, Antonio Estache and Sergio Perelman for their insightful suggestions. 
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In both developed and less developed countries, one can speak of a crisis of the public 
sector. The main charge is that it is costly for what it delivers. Costly at the revenue 
level (tax distortion, compliance cost) and at the spending level (more could be 
produced with less). Costly or at least costlier than would be the private sector. Even 
though this particular charge is rarely supported by hard evidence it has to be taken 
seriously because of its impact on both policy makers and public opinion. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to address the question of whether we can measure the 
performance of the public sector, a question that is very general and terribly ambitious. 
Consequently we will narrow it down by dealing with it in four stages. 
 
In the first stage we consider the public sector as a set of production units including 
firms, programs, agencies, departments such as social security administration, 
railways, national health care, education, national defence, … Each unit
3 is supposed 
to use a number of resources within a particular institutional and geographical setting 
and to produce a number of outputs, both quantitative and qualitative. Those outputs 
are related to the objective that have been assigned to the production unit by the 
principal the authority in charge, i.e., the government. 
 
If the principal were a private firm, the objective assigned to the manager would be 
simple: maximum profit. However with public authorities one has multiple objectives. 
For example, in the case of health care or education, maximizing the number of 
QALYS (years of life adjusted for quality) or the aggregate amount of human capital 
respectively, is not sufficient. Equity considerations are also among the objectives of 
health and education policy. 
 
Within such a setting the performance is going to be defined in terms of productive 
efficiency, and to measure productive efficiency, we will use the efficiency frontier 
technique. Admittedly productive efficiency is just a part of an overall performance 
analysis. It has two advantages: it can be measured, and its achievement is a 
necessary condition for any other type of efficiency. Its main drawback however is that 
it is based on a comparison among a number of rather similar production units from 
which a best practice frontier is constructed. Such a comparative approach leads to 
relative measures, and its quality depends on the quality of the observation units. 
 
We now turn to the second stage of the exercise. We pick up three areas that are 
typically areas of public spending: health, education, railways transport and we show 
how performance would be measured if data availability were not a constraint.
4 More 
precisely, when listing the outputs, the inputs and the environment of our production 
unit, we assume that the best evidence one can dream of is available. In so doing we 
avoid one of the classical problems with performance measurement, namely the 
confusion between conceptual and data problems. In particular at this stage we 
assume that the quality, not just quantity, of both inputs and outputs can be measured 
with accuracy. 
                                                           
3   In the efficiency frontier literature, one speaks of decision making units (DMU). 
4   This is consistent with the Atkinson Review (2005) who insists that the measurement of performance 
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Let us assume that we have good data for the three classes of variables: outputs, 
inputs, environmental characteristics, and that we have a wide sample of production 
units covering a certain number of years. We now use the most appropriate method 
(parametric or not) to measure the best practice frontier, as well as the relative 
performance of each production unit in each period. 
 
Can we trust these measurements? What can we do with them? If, in the sample that 
we have, the production units appear to be truly efficient, we can consider that these 
measurements approximate quite well the theoretical concept of productive 
(in)efficiency. For an efficient unit cannot produce more with the available resources. 
 
How can we explain the prevailing inefficiency? In the private sector and in a 
competitive setting, Stigler has doubted the existence of inefficiency. In this paper we 
deal with the public sector and inefficiency thus can result particularly if there are no 
efficiency incentive mechanisms. In our "ideal" data we thus have indicators pertaining 
to the presence of such mechanisms and to the degree of autonomy and competition 
that our production units (schools, hospitals, railways) are exposed to. 
 
The concept of productive efficiency does not imply a perfect ordering of production 
units. It just says that for a given vector of inputs and environmental variables one 
cannot produce more (more of one output, keeping all the others fixed). 
 
Within this "ideal" data, we believe that our measurement of productive inefficiency is 
quite reliable. However, we rarely have ideal data available. This leads us to the third 
stage. Under conditions of hard reality the data is insufficient, if not missing. This is 
even more true for less advanced countries than for OECD member countries. Given 
the available evidence, the question to be raised is that of whether or not a 
performance study makes sense. In the literature there are many studies that are 
basically useless, at least if the motivation is not just to fool people. This occurs 
because the data is plainly bad or lacking so that one ends up using input variables as 
performance indicators: number of students for the quality of education or number of 
hospitals beds in use for the level of health care. We will show for these three activities 
chosen – health care, education and railways – what has been achieved. 
 
The final stage is to try to explain inefficiency if there is any. A number of factors have 
been used to explain this: ownership, competition, autonomy, incentive structures, … 
Whenever the activity of the public sector can be entrusted to the market, privatisation 
it may be an option even though there is no guarantee that the market always leads to 
performance improvement. Quite often activities of the public sector cannot be easily 
privatised, and thus policies to enhance efficiency have to be found within the public 
sector itself. 
 
The next sections are devoted to illustrating and discussing these stages. An 
additional section discusses the issue of measuring the performance of the whole 
public sector without using any input, which applies particularly to the performance of 
social protection. A final section presents conclusions regarding the merits of the 
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2.  The performance Approach
5 
 
2.1. Productive efficiency 
 
In this section we present what we call the "performance approach" to the public 
sector. We look at the public sector as a set of departments or programs that can be 
seen as production units (DMU) with one or several persons in charge that are defined 
as agents. These agents operate in a given institutional setting; they use a number of 
inputs and provide a number of outputs that correspond to the objectives assigned to 
them by the public authority that is defined as the principal. In section 6 we will 
consider the possibility of measuring the performance of the public sector as a whole, – 
a more ambitious task but one that has the advantage to including all the transversal 
spillovers that a sectoral analysis might ignore. 
 
The gist of this paper is that most measures of performance of the public sector are 
highly questionable. By contrast the productive efficiency criterion appears to be more 
reliable measurement for appreciating and comparing the performance of the public 
sector. As already mentioned, our approach rests on the "principal agent" relationship 
that links the person in charge of the production unit (DMU) with the public authority. 
Performance is thus defined by the extent to which the agent(s)s fulfil(s) the objectives 
assigned by the principal. 
 
The principal, that is the State taken as representing Society as a whole, has multiple 
objectives because of the many dimensions of social welfare. As a result the missions 
assigned to the agents are also multifold, so that and the performance-assessing issue 
becomes more complex than that of private firms where the profit level is the 
performance measurement. 
 
Multidimensional objectives are thus unavoidable when assessing public sector 
performance. Economists distinguish three main classes of objectives. The first is 
allocative and it comprises both technical (or productive)
6 and price efficiency. The 
second one concerns macroeconomic consideration: growth and employment. The 
third one is one of equity. Equity is a notoriously slippery concept, implying that the 
incidence of any public activity on income distribution has to be taken into account. 
 
Beyond the recognition that a multidimensional approach is essential, a number of 
difficulties arise that we will deal with briefly, each in its own turn. First, the objectives 
assigned to the public sector may not always be completely compatible with one 
another. One knows, for example, that peak load pricing for the railroad is desirable 
from an allocative viewpoint, but often distributively objectionable. Thus, when 
assessing the overall performance of any public activity, a delicate balance must be 
struck between equity and efficiency considerations. 
 
Second, measuring the degree to which those objectives are satisfied is quite a difficult 
task. It involves computing first an indicator of partial performance for each of them, 
and then proceeding to weigh some of those indicators, which cannot be resolved 
without some basic value judgements. 
                                                           
5  This section summarizes Marchand et al. (1984) and Pestieau and Tulkens (1993). 
6   In the rest of this paper we use "technical" or "productive" efficiency interchangeably; we also use as 
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Third, the only objective the achievement of which does not impede that of the others is 
technical efficiency. Producing too little or employing too many factors as compared to 
what is technically feasible cannot be justified in terms of any of the other objectives 
listed above (macroeconomic, allocative, redistributive). By contrast, hiring labor in (too 
large) quantities that are allocatively inefficient can be legitimated by macroeconomic 
considerations of employment policy. 
 
Fourth, the trade-offs between allocative and non-allocative objectives can have effects 
on the controllability of the production unit. Indeed, it can be allocatively inefficient for 
two reasons, first because it has to fulfil non-allocative goals and second because the 
agent is concerned with personal objectives (e.g., the three P's, power, prestige and 
pay). The difficulty then arises in sorting out these two sources of inefficiency, which 
has often been presented as an argument in favor of privatisation and deregulation. In 
a competitive setting a private firm is supposed to be efficient both, technically and 
allocatively. 
 
In view of the above, we advocate in this paper that the performance of public 
enterprises be measured and compared on the basis of productive efficiency only. Our 
reasons are twofold: on the one hand, the global performance evaluation problem, that 
is measuring how close a production unit comes to achieving all the objectives just 
listed is, in our opinion, too ambitious. Both data and techniques of analysis currently 
available make such an undertaking unachievable. On the other hand, since productive 
efficiency allows for evaluations that are consistent with the manifold objectives of the 
production unit at stake, it definitively constitutes a step in the right direction. 
 
2.2.  The frontier method of measuring productive efficiency 
 
Over the course of the last two decades, a number of methods for measuring 
productive efficiency have been proposed. They all have in common the frontier 
concept which states that efficient units are those operating "on" the frontier of their 
respective production set, while inefficient firms operate "below" that frontier (i.e. in the 
interior of their production set). These methods also have in common their reliance on 
inference. Indeed, statistical data that report on the outputs achieved and the inputs 
used by a productive organisation do not provide the production set per se, no more 
than they yield the production frontier. Both must be inferred, namely constructed from 
the data, prior that any efficiency computation can be made. Hence the happy 
expression of "best-practice frontier" whereby Farrell (1957) originally designated the 
production frontier that he was the first to derive from statistical data. 
 
To estimate best practice frontiers two main alternative methodologies are available: 
parametric ones, and non-parametric. The difference between them lies in the 
technique used to formally describe the frontier. In the first case a usual function with 
constant parameters – e.g. Cobb-Douglas, or translog – is specified a priori. Its 
parameters are estimated by statistical or other methods in such a way that the graph 
of the function best "envelops" the data "from above", that is, observations appearing to 
lie on or below this graph. Then, the efficiency of each observation is computed in 
terms of the distance between the observation and the graph of the estimated function, 
now considered to be the frontier of the production set. This distance is usually 
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by the function. Notice that the efficiency measure thus obtained may differ according 
to which functional form is specified a priori. Usage of this parametric method is mostly 
found in the econometric literature. 
 
In the second case that of the non-parametric methodology, what is specified a priori is 
not an explicit function but rather some formal properties that the points in the 
production set are assumed to satisfy: e.g. free disposal, convexity (implying either non 
increasing returns to scale for the frontier, or some form of variable returns) or 
proportionality (implying constant returns). Data are then "enveloped", too, not by the 
graph of a function whose parameters are estimated, but instead by determining 
whether or not each observed point can be considered to be an element of the frontier, 
under the chosen assumption(s). This is done by solving an appropriately defined 
system of linear equations – one such system for each observation. The same system 
can then serve to associate each observation with a numerical efficiency score that 
measures again the distance between the observation and the frontier. Here as above, 
the efficiency measure obtained for each observation may differ according to which 
formal assumptions are specified a priori on the production set. Usage of non-
parametric methodologies in generally prevalent in the management science and 
operational research literature. It tends also to prevail in public sector areas in which 
the concept of production function is not obvious. The two best-known non parametric 
methods are the DEA for "data envelopment analysis" and FDH for "free disposal hull". 
 
For both categories of methods, parametric and non-parametric, the data set can be 
either a cross-section of several productive units, or a time series of observations of the 
same unit. In the first case, direct application of any one of the above methods implicitly 
assumes that for all units the production set is the same. In the second case, it 
assumes that the production set remains unchanged over time. Either one of these 
assumptions can be relaxed, provided information other than just input and output 
quantities can be included in the analysis. They may include extraneous characteristics 
specific to some subsets of cross-sectional observations, or time-related characteristics 
in the case of time-series observations. When time is involved, considerations relating 
to technical progress (or regress) are particularly relevant, because of the issue of 
sorting out efficiency gains (movements towards the frontier) from progress (frontier 
shifts). Both parametric and non-parametric methods have recently offered extensions 
in this direction. 
 
As both classes of methodologies do operate on exactly the same database, viz. input 
and output quantities, a given data set can always be subjected to both efficiency 
measurements (and furthermore, within each class, to different functional specifications 
or set theoretic assumptions). The respective virtues of one or the other approach are, 
therefore, to be evaluated not so much based on the nature of the data, but rather in 
terms of the answers each method may provide the analyst in his research. 
 
2.3.  Pros and cons 
 
We now turn to the merits of productive efficiency-based indicators of performance as 
compared to other indicators. As was pointed out above, productive efficiency does not 
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A second advantage of the productive efficiency viewpoint is that it relies on physical 
data that is readily available in many instances, and basically more reliable than 
financial or accounting data. Third, unlike most partial indicators of performance, 
productive efficiency can encompass a large number of inputs and outputs, including 
qualitative aspects without having to go through disputable aggregation. Finally, since 
the concept of productive efficiency is both intuitive and unambiguous, its 
measurement generally finds a wide consensus. 
 
Admittedly, production efficiency is only a partial indicator of performance. But 
compared to traditional indicators, it is by far a more robust method to apply to 
production units operating in changing market structure or alternative production 
settings. 
 
The idea that technical efficiency is achievable independently of the other objectives 
assigned to the production unit and particularly of allocative efficiency has been 
challenged on various counts. Here we only consider one of the most usual objections 
that pertains to the term of adjustment. The "short term" objection is quite intuitive and 
goes as follows: a production unit can be constrained to be technically inefficient if it is 
forced to employ too much of a factor of production, or to supply too little of a service 
without being able to quickly adjust its input-output vector so as to remain on the 
efficiency frontier. Take the example of a public railway company, whose demand just 
dropped by a lot, and assume that it is not allowed to lay off or reassign any of its 
employees. It is obvious that in the short run, such a firm is doomed to be technically 
inefficient. After some time, however it should be able to reduce its idle labor force 




3. Ideal  Data 
 
We now turn to the issue of measuring the productive efficiency of three public 
activities: railway transportation, secondary education and health care. At the outset, 
we assume that there are no problems with availability of data. As we are interested in 
making international comparisons, we assume that we have data for a very large 
number of countries and also for a long series of years. We will start with railways, 




As we will see in the next section there are a number of international comparisons of 
technical efficiency of railways. Here we don't have any restriction on data availability. 
In particular, we assume that for the output, namely transport of persons and of 
commodities, we have indicators of quantity but also of quality – comfort, reliability of 
delivery, punctuality. We can also use data on equity of access to measure 
accessibility across income scale, time and location. On the input side, we need to 
know what kind of labor is being used, with sufficient desaggregation concerning skill 
and experience. We also need information on equipment also disaggregated by type 
and quality, the length and the quality of the tracks, and finally the different sources of 
energy. Given that railway companies may operate in very different geographical and 
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autonomy, the extent of competition and contestability they are subject to. We also 
need to know about the constraints regarding price discrimination and community 
service obligations. All theses items are listed in Table 1 to which we come back when 
we discuss real life data and recent studies. 
 
In Table 1 we ask for a large number of observations. Ravaillion (2005) insists on this 
point arguing that the precision of efficiency estimates rises with the number of data 
points and falls with the number of input and output variables. 
 
Table 1 - Performance measure of national railways 
 
Ideal data  Data used 
in recent studies 
    
Outputs Passenger  kilometres  v 
 Comfort  and  punctuality  ~ 
  Freight tons and kilometers  v 
 -  bulk  ~ 
 -  containers  ~ 
 -  others  ~ 
  Delivery quality and punctuality  ~ 
  Equity of access  – 
    
Inputs Labor  (disaggregated)  v 
  Equipment (disaggregated by type and by 
quality) 
v 
  Tracks (length and quality)  ~ 
 Energy  (sources)  ~ 
    
Environment  Geography, stage length  ~ 
 Autonomy  ~ 
  Competition or contestability  ~ 
  Passengers per seat  ~ 
 Price  discrimination  ~ 
  Community service obligation  ~ 
    
Observations  Very large number of years and countries  Too small 
 




We narrow down the study of education to that of secondary public education. We 
have first to define the objectives of the government  (national or local). One can 
reasonably cite skill in reading and writing, in mathematics and science along with the 
capacity to eventually find employment or going to college. Given that we deal with 
people aged 18 who come from different backgrounds, we need indicators regarding 
average and dispersion. As ideal outputs, we would have: 
 
•  individual skills in reading, language, math and science 
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We would use the subgroup of individuals who went through public education. Also 
these output indicators have to be view incrementally, namely relative to what they 
were at the start of secondary education. 
 
On the input side one can take two views: physical or financial. The physical inputs 
are the number and the quality of teachers and administrative staff, the building, and 
the educational materials. Here too what is important is how inputs are allocated 
among pupils. Alternatively one can look at overall public spending. Indeed, there are 
two production processes: the first is from financial spending to physical inputs and the 
second from inputs to outputs with the possibility of shortcut by going from spending to 
final outputs. 
 
To compare these input-output vectors and use the traditional measure of best 
practice, it is important to distinguish comparison within and between countries. In a 
within country comparison, e.g., among school districts, one has the advantage of 
dealing with the same institutional and cultural setting. The environmental features that 
can be useful for performance measurement are the socio-economic characteristics of 
school districts: educational level, income level and income inequality, unemployment, 
population size and population density. The role of the family is also very important. In 
a between-country study, one has to expectedly introduce institutional variables: 
political decentralization, educational system, mobility of students, share of private 
schools. 
 
Table 2 presents a list of outputs, inputs and environmental variables that we find ideal. 
They concern an international comparison, which implies that we need data for several 
years and a large number of countries. 
 
Table 2 - Performance of public education at the secondary level 
 
Ideal data  Recent studies 
    
Output  Acquired skills (of sample of 18y. old 
individuals) 
 
  - math, science, reading  v 
  - foreign languages  – 
 Direct  employability  – 
  Indirect employability (through college)  ~ 
 Happiness  – 
  Contribution to R and D  ~ 
    
Input  Teachers (level and quality)  ~ 
 Staff  ~ 
 Building,  equipment  v 
  Spatial distribution of schools  – 
  Skills at the end of the primary education level  – 
    
Environment  Competition between networks   
  Competition with private schools  ~ 
  Role of the family  – 
  Unemployment rate, economic growth  ~ 
 Pedagogical  technique  ~ 
    
Observations  Large number of countries and years 
 
~ 
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3.3. Health  care 
 
Since we can ask for any data we wish, we would like to start with data reflecting how 
the individual expected lifetime and health status have increased following health care 
use. We would also like to use some information about the quality of the care delivered. 
With these individual data we can thus measure average values and inequality 
indicators. Also available would be longevity and quality of health in the absence of 
public intervention: social insurance, public hospitals and preventive health policy. 
 
The quality of care is important since we are not only interested by the efficiency of 
medical treatment but also by the way it is delivered. 
 
Turning to the inputs, we would use data on the number of physicians, nurses, staff, 
hospitals, beds and on the quantity of equipment as well as data on the way all these 
variables are distributed across space and population. The quality dimension of these 
inputs is also very important.  
 
Also important is social spending especially if one wants to conduct an intermediate 
efficiency exercise with social spending as input and the different inputs as outputs. 
 
Table 3 - Performance of public systems of health care 
 
  Ideal data  Current studies 
    
Output  Quality of care (average, distribution)  – 
  Incremental life time (average, distribution)  ~ 
  Incremental health status (average, distribution)  ~ 
    
Input  Physician (speciality, quality, geographical, 
distribution) 
~ 
  Nurses (speciality, quality, geographical, distribution)  ~ 
  Hospitals (speciality, quality, geographical, 
distribution) 
~ 
 Social  expenditure  v 
    
Environment  Ratio of curative to preventive care  ~ 
  Physical exercise, diet  – 
 Age  structure  v 
  Role of the private sector  ~ 




What we call the environmental variables is crucial. The effectiveness of healthcare 
interventions surely influences the extent of premature mortality, but much less than 
wide social and environmental factors such as sanitation, housing conditions and 
education, individual lifestyle factors such as smoking, poor diet and lack of physical 
activity. Intervenes also the age structure of the population. As the number and 
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We chose a couple of relatively recent comparative studies, those of Cowie and 
Reddington (1996) and Land and Lin (2002). They both start with the standard lines 
against measurements such as profit and labor productivity, and in favor of a 
production possibility frontier approach. In Cowie and Reddington, devoted to the study 
of 14 European railways for the year 1992, two alternative outputs are considered: 
passenger trains kilometers (physical measure) and rail service provision (reflecting 
public service obligation). On the input side we have the number of employees, state 
rail capital and population density. The author use parametric (e.g. DOLS) and non 
parametric (DEA) methods that provide results that are broadly similar. They also 
compare their results with those of several previous studies and observe several 
differences. What is striking with this study is that it uses very rough data for both 
inputs and outputs and none for the institutional setting. 
 
Lan and Lin (2002) cover a wider sample of countries (85) that are much more 
heterogeneous than those studied above. They also resort to both a parametric 
(stochastic frontier) and a non-parametric method (DEA). They use length of lines, 
number of locomotives and cars, and number of employees as input factors and train-
kilometer as output. Not surprisingly, they observe that the efficiency scores vary with 
the method used. 
 
Some earlier studies even though using less complete data attempted to explain 
efficiency slacks by factors such as managerial freedom [Oum and Yu (1991)] or % of 





In a recent paper Alonso and St. Aubeyn (2005) study the cross-country efficiency of 
secondary education provision using the PISA indicators for 25 mostly OECD 
countries. Performance is measured on the basis of these indicators. As inputs, the 
authors use the ratio of teachers to students and time spent at school. Alonso and  
St. Aubyn proceed in two stages: first they use DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) to 
construct a best practice frontier. Then, they try to explain efficiency slacks with a 
number of environmental variables. Among these variables, GDP per head and 
parental educational level happen to be the more significant ones with an obviously 
positive influence. Pisa indicators concern the skill of 15-year-olds in the following 
areas: reading, mathematics, problems solving and science literacy. Note that these 
four indicators are highly correlated (over 0.94). 
 
When discussing the performance of an educational system, e.g. secondary education, 
there is a wide agreement on the indicators to be used: test scores, earning capacity, 
and the like. The question is whether the resources devoted to schools influence 
educational performance. In the US, where research is the most abundant, the 
evidence is mixed. There is an important school of thought
8 that argues that "the 
                                                           
7   In the same paper the efficiency measures of postal services are corrected to take into 
account the role of tendering, which plays a significant role. 
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resources devoted to the schools are not closely or consistently related to the student 
outcome." 
 
At first sight this result is not surprising. After all the objectives of welfare states 
regarding education is not merely to maximize the average level of skills and expected 
earnings. Distribution is also important. Furthermore, schooling is not the only input: 
family background is also terribly important. As in the case of health where explaining 
longevity by mere medical spending is ludicrous, explaining educational spending just 
in terms of educational expenditures is nonsensical. 
 
There is another question that appears when direct quality measures of education are 
not available. Is it then legitimate to use simple measures of the resources devoted to 
education as a substitute of performance measure? Fortunately there now exist quality 
indicators that are comparable: not only PISA but also TIMSS (Third International 
Mathematics and Science Study). In a recent paper Hanushek and Luque (2003), using 
this latter performance indicator for 37 countries, show that the influence of resources 
on student performance appears rather limited, even though it is more positive than in 
the corresponding analysis of US achievement. 
 
The main lesson to draw from these studies is that it is important to include 
distributional aspects in the performance indicators. One of the rationales for public 
education is indeed that it insures every citizen with equal opportunity. In that respect, 
Grosskopf et al. (1997) study the educational performance of Texas school districts by 
focusing on the conflict between expenditure equality and achievement equality. 
 
It is quite clear that for education there is a long way between the performance 
indicators found in the literature and what we call the ideal indicators. Too many 
important variables are missing particularly those pertaining to individual characteristics 
of teachers and pupils. 
 
4.3. Health  care 
 
As in the case of railways and education, we have chosen a couple of recent and 
typical studies regarding the comparative efficiency of health care systems. The first 
one is that of Lin et al. (2006) who compare health system across Canadian provinces 
and American States. The second one is by Afonso and St. Aubyn (2004) comparing 
health expenditure efficiency in OECD countries. The North American study uses DEA 
to assess the performance of health care at sub-national levels. Inputs are measured 
alternatively in quantity and in values and they include physicians, nurses, hospitals 
and pharmaceuticals. Outputs are life expectancy at birth, low birth weight, infant 
mortality, self-reported health and potential years of life lost following specific diseases. 
The advantage of using the sub-national approach is that it gives a sample of about 60 
DMU from a relatively homogeneous environment. The general conclusion is that most 
of the Canadian provinces, as well as a fair number of American states are on the 
efficiency frontier. For the others there is a wide range of efficiency scores. Lin et al. 
(2003) interpret this last result as indicating differences in health policies within the US. 
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Afonso and St. Aubyn (2004) address the same issue for a sample of OECD countries. 
As inputs, they use in-patients beds, medical technology indicators and employment or 
total expenditure. As outputs, they use infant mortality and life expectancy. They resort 
to the two standard non-parametric methods: FDH and DEA. 
 
The average efficiency varies between 0.743 (1 input, 2 outputs and DEA) and 0.959 (3 
inputs, 2 outputs and FDH). Korea, Mexico and Turkey are the only countries 
consistently efficient across the various specifications adopted by the authors. Hence 
they conclude that: "in less efficient countries there is scope for attaining better results 
using the very same resources." Such a conclusion would be undisputable if we could 
be sure that efficiency is being correctly measured. 
 
Finally, let us mention the ranking of the World Health Organization (WHO, 2000) 
concerning the efficiency of the health care systems of 191 countries. The key health 
output indicator is the disability adjusted life expectancy. But the WHO also uses a 
measure of fairness in financing and what is termed "responsiveness". In the overall 
ranking France gets the top position; Canada is 30th after Morocco, and the US 37th 
just before Cuba. 
 
These studies are undoubtedly interesting. But their major weakness is that they 
neglect the fact that what explains most of their performance indicators is not the 
quantity or the quality of health care interventions, but a set of environmental factors 
and lifestyle aspects. Smoking, physical inactivity and obesity contribute more to the 
two main causes of mortality and morbidity, i.e., circulating diseases and cancer, than 
healthcare. To measure the performance of health care systems, it is thus essential to 
control for these determinants. This being said, the relationship between these wide 
determinants and health, though well established, is complex and calls for further 
research. 
 
Another dimension that is consistently neglected in performance studies is the issue of 
health inequalities. There exists some work on the redistributive effect of public health 
care system, but without focus on the productive efficiency issue.
9 
 
To conclude, we observe a big difference between railways on the one hand and either 
health and education on the other hand. Railways activities and performance can be 
accounted for by the inputs we have considered. Health an education even when these 
are mainly public cannot be explained by just the traditional inputs (labor, capital, etc.), 
but by a number of environmental factors. Thus, if we could count on data reflecting all 
the determinants of good education and good health, we could not measure the 
efficiency of public activities but that of a complex system wherein culture and family 
are as important as labor and investment. 
 
Does that mean that we cannot assess the performance of, say, the health care system 
of different countries? As we argue in the next section, we can compare health care 
systems in terms of their achievements without making any judgment as to their 
efficiency. To take an example, we can evaluate the performance of students in a class 
on the basis of their grades. To evaluate them and rank according to their respective 
merits, committing time, … is much more difficult. 
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5.  Measuring Performance without Inputs 
 
Recently the EU has developed a strategy for improving the performance of social 
policy among its member states. The central idea is to agree upon a number of social 
indicators pertaining to poverty, including its intensity and persistence, income 
inequality, non monetary deprivation, low educational attainment, unemployment, 
joblessness, poor health, poor housing and homelessness, functional illiteracy and 
innumeracy, and restricted social participation.
10 We may assume that this selection of 
indicators is a compromise that reflects the view of the EU country members on what 
are the objectives of social protection. These indicators are now published on a regular 
basis with the explicit intent of inducing each country to get as close as possible to the 
best score. This approach, labelled the Open Coordination Method, is in the spirit of the 
so-called "yardstick competition". Accordingly citizens of each country base their 
electoral choices on the relative performance of their incumbent's policy. 
 
It is tempting to use such indicators to assess the performance of the different 
European welfare states. Given the small number of the latter, and the big number of 
the former, it is not surprising that most countries happen to be efficient. However by 
reducing the number of indicators (using the principal components analysis) and 
increasing the number of EU countries (to 25) one can hope to get fewer countries on 
the best practice frontier. One can then raise two interesting questions. What are we 
measuring? Does it make sense to measure performance without looking at the inputs 
and, in particular, at the level of spending underlying all the social policies involved. 
 
Our feeling is that to the extent that those indicators have been selected by member 
countries, some of which have played strategically, picking indicators in areas where 
they excel, we can consider that a best practice frontier constructed from them is quite 
meaningful. Naturally the risk of manipulation is unavoidable. A country x, knowing that 
its strongest point is the relative number of centenarians, will lobby to include this 
variable among the social indicators. Looking at the indicators chosen, one does not 
see such an example. One just observes potential conflicts between classic objectives 
such as increased employment and decreased poverty. 
 
The second question concerns the absence of inputs in the analysis. Even though it 
does not make economic sense to look at the best practice frontier without taking into 
account the resources used by the welfare state to achieve its multiple objectives, one 
realizes that, in general, in popular comparison exercises one rarely looks at the input 
side. Even in golf the standard ranking does not use the players' handicap. Another 
reason for not using resources used is that they are much more controversial than the 
output indicators. To keep the example of social policy, all social expenditures are not 
used for the purpose at hand and the role of both family (particularly for education and 
health) and the market are crucial but very difficult to measure. Moreover the 
government can influence both the market and the family by contributing to social 
welfare through its tax expenditure policy, i.e., tax break for supplementary insurance, 
subsidized parental leaves, etc. 
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Without neglecting these observations, using social spending to measure the 
productive efficiency of welfare states regarding social protection leads to interesting 
results.
11 Table 4 presents the outcome of a recent study of the performance of 
European Welfare States using two (poverty, long term unemployment) or four 
(poverty, long term unemployment, education and health) indicators. The aggregation 
technique is the DEA that is applied to the case when all countries are assumed to use 
the same resources and when actual social spending is adopted. It is not surprising to 
observe that when the number of indicators increase, more countries are on the best 
practice frontier and it is neither striking to see that with social expenditure used as 
input more countries are "inefficient" particularly those which are known to have a 
"generous" welfare states. 
 
Table 4 - Efficiency at getting close to the best practise frontier 
Without Input  With social expenditure 




Countries  POV LTU  POV LTU 
EDU HEALTH 
POV LTU  POV LTU 
EDU HEALTH 
Austria 0.977  1  0.764  0.828 
Belgium 0.721  0.925  0.640  0.821 
Czech Rep.  1  1  1  1 
Denmark 1 1  0.823  0.823 
Estonia  0.778  0.419 1 0.609 
Finland 0.874  1  0.792  0.929 
France 0.733  1  0.533  0.776 
Germany 0.826 1  0.600  0.823 
Greece 0.453  0.879  0.288  0.635 
Hungary 0.936  0.936  0.814  0.814 
Ireland 0.942  0.946  1  1 
Italy 0.407  1  0.306  0.840 
Lithuania 0.789  0.308  0.928  0.382 
Netherlands 1  1 0.842  0.870 
Poland 0.938  0.452  0.972  0.498 
Portugal 0.907  0.907  0.634  0.635 
Spain 0.628  0.915  0.548  0.999 
United Kingdom  0.930  1  0.641  0.813 
 
Source: Lefèbvre et al. (2005) 
 
Knowing that social spending is not closely related to some indicators our view is that 
such exercise should be restricted to measuring performance without differential input. 
 
In a widely cited paper, Afonso, Schukrecht and Tanzi (2005) tackle the same problem 
for 23 OECD member countries. They estimate performance indicators for a number of 
branches such as health, administration, education, infrastructure, distribution, … 
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In a second stage they use outputs indicators along with public expenditure to measure 
an overall indicator of technical efficiency. Their main conclusion is that countries with 
small public sectors tend to be relatively more efficient. Unlike what is suggested 
above, Afonso et al.'s approach does not allow for an easy comparison of performance 
without and with inputs. 
 
In a sequel of this paper, Afonso et al. (2006) apply the same approach to the new 
member states of the European Union. They show that efficiency is fostered by a 
number of factors: civil service competence, education and secure property rights. 
 
 
6.  Policy implications and concluding remarks 
 
How can we improve upon the efficiency of the public sector when slacks are 
observed? To answer such a question, it is important to understand the sources of 
inefficiency and to distinguish two cases: the case where some other institutional 
alternative exist and the case where the service or the commodity concerned can only 
be provided by the public sector. 
 
Starting with the first case, it is widely recognized that what leads to inefficiency is not 
the type of ownership, but the absence of competition or at least of contestability. This 
is the view of Leibenstein (1966) who argues that monopolies, public or private, are 
likely to be what he called X-inefficient. In that vein, some have argued that 
privatisation without enhancing competition and deregulation could be socially armful. 
The greatest profit orientation of private ownership may indeed reduce allocative 
efficiency, but its effect on productive efficiency in ambiguous. 
 
The difficult case is that of activities that can only be undertaken by the State and that 
furthermore cannot be credibly subject to competition. One thinks for example of 
departments such as those of justice or social security administration. For these 
departments, performance incentives should be introduced, which requires obtaining 
an explicit and visible definition of the task(s) expected from the agents concerned. 
Transparency and mobility are essential along with a constant questioning of the 
legitimacy of entitlements. 
 
The gist of this paper is that performance measurement is possible if we can get good 
data. This is a relatively positive view as opposed to that of those who think that 
performance measurement in the social area is not possible. Recently, Ravaillion 
(2005) has questioned the theoretical foundations of measuring and explaining social 
efficiency. In particular he argues that "social indicators do not stem from anything one 
could reasonably think as a production function representing a well-defined technology 
operated by an individual producer with well defined physical inputs." This objection is 
interesting as it encompasses two important concerns: the limits of aggregation and the 
quality of data. It becomes overly negative if it rejects any attempt at assessing 
efficiency. It is clear that efficiency measurement is likely to be more convincing if it 
focuses on a narrow production unit – e.g. a given school – than on a wide unit – e.g. 
the whole educational system of a country. At the same time political debate and public 
policy are often conducted at an aggregate level. Government can be ousted or 
reforms can be undertaken because the poverty rate is relatively high or because the 
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ideal would be to conduct micro studies to explain observed aggregate inefficiency. 
This is why we believe that measuring efficiency of health care or education has to go 
through individuals and focus on the increments due to the action of public spending. 
 
To say that the existing studies are not credible is a bit extreme. What is sure is that 
they have to be interpreted with caution and that action is needed towards improving 
the quality and the quantity of data. Economists have to say something about the 
efficiency of the public sector in times where dismantling it is a hot issue. Otherwise 
they better change field. This being said, caution is important. What is also important is 
to try to explain the causes of efficiency slacks. 
 
Our final conclusion is that efficiency per se can only be seriously measured when we 
deal with production units with a well-defined technology. If we study wide components 
of the public sector or the whole public sector, then we better restrict ourselves to what 
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